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College, University of Cambridge, UK (May-June 2012). I am grateful to Hanne Appelqvist,
Bob Brandom, Hasok Chang, Heikki Kannisto, Huw Price, Henrik Rydenfelt, and Mike
Williams, as well as an anonymous referee who read an earlier draft of the essay, for
highly valuable critical comments.
 
1. Introduction
1 Historically,  there  is  presumably  relatively  little  to  be  added to  the  already existing
scholarship  on  the  relation  between  Ludwig  Wittgenstein’s  philosophy  and  the
pragmatist tradition.  Russell  Goodman’s excellent monograph, Wittgenstein and William
James (2002), tells us most that is worth telling about this issue, at least insofar as we are
concerned with Wittgenstein’s relation to the classical pragmatist William James (or even
to Charles  S.  Peirce  and John Dewey).  Any examination of  Wittgenstein’s  relation to
pragmatism must  begin  with  Goodman’s  careful  historical  work,  to  which  it  is  very
difficult to add significantly new scholarly results.1
2 Such examinations of Wittgenstein and pragmatism should also appreciate the fact that
Wittgenstein’s own brief remarks on pragmatism – such as the one in On Certainty where
he admits that his views may sound like pragmatism even though they are not really
pragmatist  (see Wittgenstein 1969:  § 422;  cf.  also Wittgenstein 1980a:  § 266;  Goodman
2002:  11,  158)  –  must  be  understood  against  the  background  of  other  Cambridge
philosophers’, especially Bertrand Russell’s and G. E. Moore’s, conceptions of pragmatism:
Wittgenstein was clearly not a pragmatist in the sense of James’s ‘pragmatist theory of
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truth,’ but then again James himself was hardly a pragmatist in the rather naive sense of
pragmatism (and its notorious theory of truth) attributed to him by his Cambridge critics.
On the other hand, it is also clear that Wittgenstein was already at an early stage familiar
with James’s famous work, The Varieties of Religious Experience (1902), which contains a
brief account of the pragmatic method or “Peirce’s principle,” according to which our
conception of the potential or conceivable practical effects of the object of our thought is
our conception of that object in its entirety.2
3 Wittgenstein has also been intensively discussed by ‘neopragmatists’ like Richard Rorty
and Hilary Putnam, as well as their many followers; it is, however, probably too early to
evaluate  his  contribution  to  the  development  of  neopragmatist  thought,  as
neopragmatism itself is still developing as a philosophical orientation.3 One of the leading
contemporary neopragmatists, Huw Price, also insightfully employs Wittgenstein in his
defense of anti-representationalism, global expressivism, and functional pluralism – and
even explicitly refers to the similarity between Wittgensteinian “plurality of forms of
discourse, or ‘language-games’” and the “strong element of discourse pluralism in the
American  pragmatist  tradition,  of  which  [Nelson]  Goodman  and  Rorty  are  the  most
prominent recent representatives” (Price 2011: 36).4 Thus, it might seem that the relation
between Wittgenstein and pragmatism has more or less been exhausted: while Russell
Goodman has taken care of its historical dimensions, original philosophers of language
like  Price  have  made  the  most  innovative  pragmatist  use  of  Wittgenstein’s  ideas  in
contemporary systematic philosophy.
4 However, philosophically and systematically rather than historically, there is, I believe,
still a lot to say about the relation between Wittgenstein and pragmatism. By making this
distinction, I am not assuming that philosophy and its history are separable; indeed, I do
not believe in such a dichotomy at all. Rather, systematic philosophy and the history of
philosophy should be  seen as  a  holistic  network of  beliefs  and ideas  to  be  critically
examined in toto.5 I only want to emphasize that my discussion of Wittgenstein’s relation
to,  or  place  in,  pragmatism  is  not  primarily  intended  as  a  detailed  contribution  to
historical scholarship on what Wittgenstein (or the pragmatists) ‘really said.’  No new
“readings” of Wittgenstein, or striking novel historical results, will be offered. My main
aims are philosophical in the sense that I want to contribute to the re-evaluation of the
pragmatist way of philosophizing today –and, mutatis mutandis,  of the Wittgensteinian
way(s) – from the perspective of this critical comparison.6
5 The conception of pragmatism presupposed in my discussion is, as will emerge as the
argument unfolds, a more or less ‘classical’ one at least in the sense that I am not at all
convinced by Rortyan (or even Pricean) neopragmatist and antirepresentationalist ideas.
I am not strongly committed to any specific account of classical pragmatism (although I
will emphasize the view of beliefs as “habits of action,” originally defended by Peirce);
nor do I see classical pragmatism and neopragmatism as fundamentally opposed to each
other (as some scholars do). For instance, I want to avoid establishing a new essentialistic
dichotomy between classical pragmatism focusing on experience and post-linguistic-turn
neopragmatism focusing on language. A picture of pragmatism inspired by Peirce, James,
and Dewey but self-critically willing to learn from the new developments of pragmatism
itself  and  its  intellectual  neighbors  (including,  say,  analytic  philosophy  and
phenomenology)  will  remain  open  and  developing,  continuously  in  the  making  (cf.
Pihlström (ed.) 2011). This dynamic openness is what makes pragmatism a truly living
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philosophical tradition, and my proposed ‘new look’ at Wittgenstein from a pragmatist
perspective is one attempt to maintain such openness.
6 This paper is organized as follows. First, I will discuss, from a pragmatist perspective,
three key issues of Wittgenstein studies that provide useful insights into the ways in
which Wittgenstein, or the contemporary ‘Wittgensteinian’ philosopher, may be said to
be a  pragmatist:  the distinction –  invoked in recent  discussions of  Wittgenstein’s  On
Certainty, in particular – between the propositional and the non-propositional (section 2); the
related tension between anti-Cartesian fallibilism and what has been called the “truth in
skepticism” in Wittgenstein (section 3); as well as the relation between metaphysics and the
criticism  of  metaphysics  in  Wittgenstein’s  philosophy,  and  Wittgensteinian  philosophy
more generally (section 4). I will also argue that dichotomous readings of Wittgenstein in
terms  of  these  three  philosophical  (or  metaphilosophical)  oppositions  lead  to
unpragmatist  and  even  un-Wittgensteinian  positions.  I  will  then  proceed  to  a  more
explicitly metaphilosophical consideration of a fourth, equally harmful dichotomy, the
one  between deconstructive  (therapeutic)  and  (re)constructive  or  systematic,  argumentative
philosophy – which is, I will argue, again something that the pragmatist, together with
Wittgenstein, ought to overcome rather than rely on (section 5). These issues are, and
largely remain, open questions in Wittgenstein scholarship. I can here only summarize
how a pragmatist reader of Wittgenstein might, or perhaps should, deal with them; thus,
what I  will  offer is merely a pragmatist proposal to overcome certain dichotomies or
dualisms that in my view threaten to lead current Wittgenstein scholarship astray. After
having gone through these topics at a general level, I will briefly apply my considerations
to  the  philosophy  of  religion,  which  is  an  important  field  of  inquiry  for  both
Wittgensteinian and pragmatist thinkers (section 6). A short conclusion (section 7) will
finally pull the threads together.
 
2. ‘Hinges’: Propositional and Non-Propositional
7 Wittgenstein’s ‘pragmatism’ has been perceived, especially in On Certainty (1969), to focus
on non-propositional ‘hinges’ – that is, fundamental certainties-in-action that our thoughts
and any meanings those thoughts or our uses of language are able to express depend on.7
Thus,  ‘hinge  propositions’  is  actually  a  misleading  expression,  just  as  ‘grammatical
sentences’ is: hinges, in the full pragmatist sense, are not propositional but profoundly
action-based. Clearly, it is easy to suggest at a general level that Wittgenstein provides us
with a ‘pragmatist’ picture of human language-use and meaning: any meaning possible
for  us  is  grounded  in  public  human  ways  of  acting,  that  is,  language-games.
Wittgenstein’s later philosophy generally can be read as an attempt to show that it is only
against the background of our human form(s) of life, of our habits of doing various things
together in common environments, that meaning and also the learning of meanings are
possible.  In  this  sense,  Wittgenstein  establishes  a  pragmatic  philosophical  position  –
arguably as a response to a ‘transcendental’ question concerning the necessary conditions
for the possibility of meaning.8
8 The ‘pragmatist’ reading of On Certainty defended by Danièle Moyal-Sharrock makes these
ideas more precise by arguing that, for Wittgenstein, our basic certainties are ‘certainties
in action’ instead of propositionally expressible claims known with certainty to be true.
Wittgenstein, after all, says in On Certainty that “an ungrounded way of acting” is prior to
any ungrounded presupposition (Wittgenstein 1969: § 110) and that our “acting,” instead
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of “seeing,” lies “at the bottom of the language-game” (ibid.: § 204; original emphases). He
also famously quotes, approvingly, Goethe’s Faust: “In the beginning was the deed” (ibid.:
§ 402). While this reference to action as such provides a more or less standard picture of
Wittgenstein – also endorsed by Goodman (2002: 5, 19-20), who notes that the “priority of
practice over intellect” and the deep interrelation of action and thought are among the
commitments  shared  by  Wittgenstein  and William James  –  few scholars  have  joined
Moyal-Sharrock in explicitly labelling Wittgenstein’s position ‘pragmatist’ (or ‘logically
pragmatist,’ ‘pragmatist in a broad sense’). Moyal-Sharrock strongly emphasizes that the
pragmatic certainty at issue here is non-propositional, non-empirical, and non-epistemic.
A central pragmatic condition of meaning, according to Wittgenstein, is trust, understood
as an instinctive, primitive, unreasoned, immediate reaction. “Without this unflinching
trust,  there is no making sense,” Moyal-Sharrock (2003: 133) aptly notes, referring to
Wittgenstein’s (1969: § 509) famous statement that “a language-game is only possible if
one trusts something (I did not say ‘can trust something’).” For instance, the assumption
that the earth has existed for many years “forms the basis  of  action,  and therefore,
naturally, of thought” (ibid.: § 411), and this is something we trust on rather than know or
even believe to be true in the sense in which we know and believe many other things.9
9 In On Certainty, then, the ‘hinges’ of our language-game(s) are the practical certainties we
instinctively and immediately rely on – that is, what we trust without too much reasoning
about the matter. Such hinges, including, say, our continuing trust in the reality of such
things as stones and chairs or other people (not to be conflated with theoretical claims to
know,  on the basis  of  philosophical arguments,  for instance,  that  physical  objects  or
‘other minds’  ‘really  exist’),  ‘enable  sense’ instead of  themselves having sense (Moyal-
Sharrock  2003:  134).  Operating  as  such  hinges,  grammatical  rules,  in  Wittgenstein’s
special sense of ‘grammar,’ make language-games possible instead of being moves within
a game (ibid.: 134-5). A hinge, according to this reading of On Certainty, is an ‘enabler,’ not
an  hypothesis  to  be  tested  (ibid.:  135).  Wittgenstein’s  anti-skeptical  argumentation
concludes that we ‘cannot doubt’ certain things if we are to (continue to) make sense with
our  expressions  (ibid.:  138).  These  transcendental-sounding  formulations  invoke  the
practice-laden background of our language-use as the condition for the possibility of
meaning.  Moreover,  this  pragmatist  point  is  highlighted  by  the  fact  that,  while
Wittgenstein’s  philosophy  is  of course  centrally  focused  on  language,  the  notion  of
language must be construed more broadly than as a mere propositional system – as,
instead, a genuine human practice within the natural world.
10 However, despite my deep appreciation of Moyal-Sharrock’s pragmatist reading, I would
modify  her  view  by  arguing  that  pragmatism  blurs  the  boundary  between  the
propositional and the non-propositional. The basic idea here is something that already
Peirce  and  James  insisted  on:  beliefs  (and,  analogously,  any  propositional  states  we
attribute to human beings) are not just propositional attitudes ‘in the head,’ that is, in the
Cartesian-like mind (or brain) of the believer, but ‘habits of action’ in the world.10 The
notion of a habit is crucial here. While I must simply use it in a vague and general sense in
this context, referring to the traditional pragmatist idea that to believe something is to be
prepared  to  act  in  certain  ways,  this  notion  of  a  habit  could  in  a  more  detailed
investigation  be  fruitfully  compared  to  Wittgensteinian  notions  such  as  custom,
technique, and perhaps also game.11 After all, Wittgenstein does say in the Investigations
(1953, I, § 150) that learning a language is mastering a technique. Accordingly, engaging
in any propositional activity can be said to be based on human activities or habits, ways of
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doing things in a normatively governed, though always possibly changing, manner. There
is no fixed or permanent normative structure of language; as Jaakko Hintikka has often
remarked  in  his  studies  on  Wittgenstein,  language-games  themselves  are,  for
Wittgenstein, “prior to their rules.”12
11 There  is,  then,  for  a  pragmatist  reader  of  Wittgenstein  inspired  by  the  classical
pragmatists’ emphasis on habits and habituality, no dichotomy between the propositional
and the non-propositional in the sense of ‘pragmatist’  interpretations of Wittgenstein
such  as  Moyal-Sharrock’s.  Relying  on  such  a  dichotomy,  which,  in  Moyal-Sharrock’s
reading,  is  intended  to  yield  a  new form of  foundationalism –  an  action-based  and
therefore non-propositional rather than propositional response to scepticism – is both
unpragmatist and un-Wittgensteinian. While Moyal-Sharrock is certainly correct to point
that the ‘hinges’ Wittgenstein invokes are not propositional in the standard sense (any
more than they are epistemic or hypothetical), neither aspect – the propositional or the
non-propositional – of the certainties Wittgenstein examines should be denied, or even
can be denied, as they are inextricably intertwined.
12 This,  however,  is  a  pragmatist  reinterpretation  of  (the  third)  Wittgenstein,  not  an
attempt to interpret Wittgenstein’s actual views with any detailed historical accuracy.
Even  so,  the  denial  of  the  dichotomy  between  the  propositional  and  the  non-
propositional – or, similarly, between the linguistic and the non-linguistic – does in my
view capture the ‘spirit’ of On Certainty better than a dichotomous interpretation, even a
‘logically pragmatist’ one.
 
3. Knowledge and Certainty: Fallibilism and the Truth
in Skepticism
13 As  a  result  of  its  remarkable  conception  of  certainties-in-action,  Wittgenstein’s  On
Certainty is, furthermore, anti-skeptical and anti-Cartesian in a way strongly resembling
Peirce’s famous anti-Cartesian writings from the 1860s (see again Peirce 1992-98, vol. 1).
Both  philosophers  maintain,  in  contrast  to  Descartes’s  notorious  methodological
skepticism, that we cannot begin our inquiries from complete doubt. Rather, we must,
inevitably, always begin from within our beliefs – or, what amounts to the same, our
habits  of  action –  that  already presuppose a  great  number of  various  certainties,  or
‘hinges.’ Otherwise there can be no knowledge or inquiry at all, or even any meaning,
according to Wittgenstein (see section 2 above).
14 In Peirce’s philosophy of science, this anti-Cartesian starting point is developed into the
well-known  thesis  of  fallibilism:  we  could  always  be  wrong,  even  though  we  cannot
simultaneously doubt everything we believe. Any of our beliefs could be wrong, and we
might, as inquiry progresses, have reasons to revise or give up even our most strongly
maintained views or theories. We just cannot give all of them up at the same time. We
have to have a firm basis for revising those parts of our belief system that need revision,
even though that basis itself may also be called into question at a different time or from a
different point of  view.  There is  no final,  universal,  or apodictic  certainty to be had
anywhere in human affairs; our inquiries are fallible and revisable through and through.
15 This fallibility or revisability is fully natural for us as the kind of beings we are. As our
factual circumstances change, as our forms of life are continuously recontextualized, the
basic  certainties  constitutive of  our language-games and of  the meanings expressible
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within them may have to be revised or given up, though not on the basis of reason or
evidence because (as ‘hinges’) they are not based on reason or evidence (cf. Hertzberg
1994, especially 48-50). In this sense “our language-games are tied to the actual world we
live in” (ibid.: 59).
16 It would presumably be misleading to call Wittgenstein a ‘fallibilist.’ This would indicate
that he has a theory to advance in epistemology and the philosophy of science, something
comparable  to  Peirce’s  (and  Dewey’s)  pragmatist  and  naturalist  theory  of  inquiry
emphasizing the gradual revision of our beliefs and habits of action in the course of
experience, where inquiry is launched as a response to the problematic situations arising
from surprising and unexpected results of our actions that make us doubt the original
beliefs (habits) we had been relying on. Yet, while it is clear that he does not defend such
a theory,  or presumably any epistemic theory at all,  his conception of the pragmatic
hinges briefly explored in the previous section should be understood in a fallibilistic
‘spirit.’  These practice-embedded certainties  are never final  but  must  be revised and
corrected, as our practices and/or forms of life change and develop. Even the strongest of
our hinges may have to be given up in new circumstances, although we may be unable to
even coherently consider the possibility of having to give up our belief in, say, physical
objects. In this general attitude to our relation to the world we live in (and inquire into),
Wittgenstein is,  I  submit,  a  pragmatic  fallibilist.  Moreover,  insofar as  Wittgenstein is
understood not only as a thinker with pragmatist inclinations but also as a post-Kantian
transcendental  philosopher  employing  transcendental  arguments  and reflections  (see
also section 5 below), this choice of terminology might also play the important role of
reaffirming  the  transcendental  philosopher’s  entitlement  to  fallibilism  and
antifoundationalism: even if we inquire, transcendentally, into the necessary conditions for
the possibility of things we take for granted, the results of such inquiries need not be
regarded as apodictically certain.13
17 This idea has also been expressed by saying that, while Wittgenstein’s late work is clearly
anti-skeptical,  there is an appreciation of the ‘truth in skepticism’ to be found in his
philosophy as  well.  Precisely the fact  that  our language-games,  forms of  life,  and/or
habits of  action14 do  not  have  any  metaphysical  grounding  or  foundation  can  be
understood as such a recognition of the fundamental truth of skepticism, even though,
again, skepticism as a philosophical theory cannot be maintained.15 As a philosophical
position,  skepticism  results  from  a  theoretical  urge  that  both  pragmatism  and
Wittgenstein  reject.  Skepticism  should  be  overcome  not  by  offering  a  theoretical
argument that finally silences the skeptic (this cannot be done) but by investigating the
ways in which the skeptic’s “game” is dispensable – that is, there is no need for us to
philosophize in terms of that game, following its rules – while containing a fundamental
seed  of  truth  in  the  sense  of  making  us  better  aware  of  our  groundlessness  and
precariousness.
18 Similarly,  the  ‘officially’  strongly  anti-skeptical  pragmatists  reject  all  foundationalist
theoretical attempts to “ground” knowledge, science, meaning – or anything – in anti-
skeptical philosophical arguments. Space does not allow me to elaborate on this theme
further here, but it seems to me that pragmatists and pragmatic fallibilists and naturalists
(following  Dewey)  have  often  dramatically  neglected  their  clear  similarities  to
Wittgensteinian  antifoundationalism  and  ‘fallibilism.’  Both  sides  would  benefit  from
deepening  comparisons  that  would  also  strengthen  the  status  of  a  general
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antifoundationalism in contemporary thought still too often troubled by foundationalist
concerns both in epistemology and in ethics and political philosophy.
19 In any case, our conclusion at this point is that there need be no conflict or dichotomy
between our commitment to fallibilism and our commitment to the ‘truth in skepticism.’
Both are pragmatically needed (and both are available in Wittgenstein),  just  like the
propositional and the non-propositional cannot be dichotomously separated but must
both be incorporated in our pragmatist picture of practice-embedded human being-in-
the-world.16
 
4. Reality: Metaphysics and Anti-Metaphysics
20 Both  Wittgenstein  and  the  pragmatists  have  often  been  regarded  as  radically  anti-
metaphysical  thinkers,  even  though  Peirce,  in  particular,  is  also  famous  for  his
evolutionary metaphysics (see, e.g., Anderson & Hausman 2012) and even Dewey has been
argued  to  incorporate  metaphysical  themes  in  his  naturalism (cf.  Sleeper  1986).  For
instance,  Rorty  (typically  downgrading  Peirce’s  importance  in  the  development  of
pragmatism) repeatedly pictures both Jamesian-Deweyan pragmatism and Wittgenstein’s
later  philosophy  in  an  anti-metaphysical  and  anti-epistemological  fashion,  and more
recent  neopragmatists  like  Price  (2011)  share  this  negative  attitude  to  metaphysics.
However, as I have argued in several works (e.g., Pihlström 2009) –but won’t be able to
argue  in  detail  here–  this  is  a  fundamental  misrepresentation  of pragmatism.  The
pragmatists – and, perhaps analogously, Wittgenstein – can be seen as offering us a new
kind of metaphysics, one based not on the futile attempt to climb above our forms of life
into a God’s-Eye View but on human practices and especially our practice-embedded
ethical and  more  generally  evaluative  standpoints  and  considerations.  Engaging  in
metaphysics is a way of interpreting our human being-in-the-world, which cannot be
separated from ethical values (or other values, including aesthetic ones, for that matter).
This  general  idea is  also closely related to the pragmatist  rejection of  the fact-value
dichotomy.17
21 This is not at all to say that either pragmatists or Wittgenstein would not engage in the
criticism of metaphysics. Obviously, they do. They both heavily criticize not only specific
metaphysical ideas (e.g., Cartesian assumptions in the philosophy of mind or the picture
of meanings as mental or abstract entities untouched by the practices of language-use)
but also, and more importantly, the very conception of metaphysics based on traditional
pre-Kantian  metaphysical  realism  (transcendental  realism),  just  as  Kant  himself  did
throughout his critique of reason. However, they need not leave the matter at that point
but are able to offer a reconstructed – or, as we might say, post-Kantian – pragmatic,
naturalized yet in a sense transcendental way of doing metaphysics in terms of, and on
the basis of, human experiential practices (forms of life, language-games). Pace Price, this
is continuing  metaphysics  “in  a  pragmatist  key”  instead  of  abandoning  metaphysics
altogether. Pragmatism and Wittgensteinian explorations of fundamental, yet revisable
and fallible, features of our forms of life here converge into what we may describe as a
pragmatic  philosophical  anthropology,  which,  transcendentally  interpreted  yet
pragmatically naturalized, is itself a form of metaphysics.
22 Moreover,  the  kind  of  pragmatism,  or  pragmatic  philosophical  anthropology,  that
Wittgenstein and philosophers like James share is deeply pluralistic (cf. again Price 2011,
chapters  2  and  10).  Both  James  and  Wittgenstein  insist  on  the  contextuality  and
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pragmatic  circumstantiality  of  human  meanings,  thought,  and  experience;  we  never
encounter the world as it is in itself but always within one or another context – that is, a
practice or a form of life. Furthermore, as there is no super-context or -practice over and
above  all  others,  there  is  no  single  correct  way  of  using  language  or  interpreting
experience, no privileged representations in the sense of the ideal language isomorphic
to the structure of the world that Wittgenstein imagined in the Tractatus (1921); instead,
there is a plurality of equally acceptable ways of conceptualizing reality through different
pragmatic engagements, each with their own valuational purposes built into them. These
may be  related  to  each  other  through networks  of  family  resemblances  –  a  famous
Wittgensteinian  notion  that  may  in  fact  be  drawn from James’s  Varieties  of  Religious
Experience (1902). Language-games are not mirrors of an independent reality, and there is
no way of representing the world from a God’s-Eye View; instead, there are only human,
contextual, pragmatically embedded perspectives from within our forms of life.
23 At  this  point  I  would like  to  draw support  from Putnam’s  account  of  Wittgenstein’s
relation  to  Kant  and  pragmatism:  “Wittgenstein  inherits  and  extends  […]  Kant’s
pluralism; that is the idea that no one language game deserves the exclusive right to be
called ‘true,’ or ‘rational,’ or ‘our first-class conceptual system,’ or the system that ‘limns
the  ultimate  nature  of  reality,’  or  anything  like  that”  (Putnam  1992,  38).  Putnam
continues  to  observe  –  very  interestingly  from  the  perspective  of  our  project  of
integrating Wittgenstein into the pragmatist tradition – that for this reason Wittgenstein
can be said to refute key ideas propounded by two leading twentieth-century pragmatists,
i.e., both W. V. Quine’s reductive naturalism and Rorty’s relativistic and postmodernist
neopragmatism: “he agrees with Rorty, against Quine, that one cannot say that scientific
language games are the only language games in which we say or write truths, or in which
we describe reality; but, on the other hand, he agrees with Quine as against Rorty that
language  games  can  be  criticized  (or  ‘combatted’);  that  there  are  better  and  worse
language games” (ibid.).18
24 Arguably,  a  Wittgensteinian  pragmatist  may  hold  that  our  practice-embedded
perspectives may, and often do, yield (or presuppose) metaphysical insights into the way
the world is, or must be thought to be (by us), from within the various practical contexts
we  operate  in. These,  again,  are  not  insights  into  the  world  as  it  is  absolutely
independently of our conceptualizing practices and value-laden practical points of view,
but they are metaphysical – or philosophical-anthropological – insights nonetheless. For
example, the well-known Wittgensteinian thesis (if we may say that Wittgenstein ever
maintained philosophical theses)19 that there can be no private language in the sense of a
language  that  only  its  speaker  could  ever  understand  or  learn  to  use,  just  like  the
pragmatically pluralistic thesis derivable from the Putnamian interpretation just cited,
can be interpreted as a metaphysical thesis about the way the world, including language
and our life with language, is, for us language-users in the kind of natural circumstances
and  contexts  (forms  of  life)  we  operate  in.  In  this  sense,  both  pragmatism  and
Wittgenstein can be understood as critically rethinking the nature of metaphysics – and
anti-metaphysics – rather than moving beyond metaphysics.20
 
5. Philosophy: Deconstruction and Reconstruction
25 In recent Wittgenstein studies, several noted scholars have suggested that Wittgenstein’s
philosophy is completely different from any traditional attempts to philosophize in terms
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of theses and arguments. Those are to be rejected as remnants of ‘dogmatic’  ways of
doing philosophy. Instead of engaging with theses and arguments, philosophy should be
therapeutical  and  deconstructive,  helping  us  get  rid  of  assumptions  that  lead  us  to
philosophical  problems  in  the  first  place.  The  ‘New  Wittgensteinians,’  taking  very
seriously  Wittgenstein’s  encouragement  to  ‘drop  the  ladder’  toward  the  end  of  the
Tractatus (Wittgenstein 1921: § 6.54) and his later proposal to lead philosophical thought
to peace’ (Wittgenstein 1953, I: § 133), support this therapeutic-deconstructive program.21
26 Again, we can perceive a misleadingly dichotomous choice between implausible extremes
at work here. To defend a modestly traditional conception of philosophy as a systematic,
argumentative practice employing theses and arguments supporting those theses is not
to be a dogmatic believer in any particular philosophical system. As a brief illustration of
this,  I  suggest  that,  despite  his  criticism  of  traditional  ways  of  doing  philosophy,
Wittgenstein can be seen as employing Kantian-styled transcendental arguments (e.g., the
private language argument) in favour of certain philosophical conceptions (e.g., the view
that our language is necessarily public).22 The private language argument can be regarded
as transcendental precisely because the fact that language is public is claimed to be a
necessary condition for the very possibility of linguistic meaning.  A private language
would not be a language at all; as Wittgenstein notes, rules cannot be followed privately.
Similarly, it could be argued that, necessarily, there must be agreement about certain
apparently empirical matters (‘hinges,’ e.g., our basic conviction about the earth having
existed for  a  long time and not  just  for,  say,  five minutes)  in order for  there to be
meaningful use of language at all.23 I  am not making any claims about the success of
Wittgenstein’s  arguments,  but  it  seems to me clear  that  he can be plausibly read as
employing the transcendental  method of  examining the necessary conditions for  the
possibility of something (e.g., meaningful language) whose actuality we take as given.24
27 Analogously, the pragmatists can also be reinterpreted as philosophers presenting and
evaluating  transcendental  arguments  (or  at  least,  more  broadly,  transcendental
considerations and inquiries), even though radical neopragmatists like Rorty have tried
to depict not only Wittgenstein but also the classical pragmatists, especially James and
Dewey,  in  a  deconstructive  manner,  as  some  kind  of  precursors  of  both  post-
Wittgensteinian  therapy  and  Derridean  deconstruction  (and  postmodernism  more
generally).  For  a  pragmatist,  there  is  no  reason at  all  to  resort  to  any unpragmatic
dichotomy between, say, “transcendental philosophical theory” and “philosophizing as an
activity”  (Pleasants  1999:  181).  Rather,  philosophical  theorizing  itself  is  a  practice-
embedded human activity, and any activity that can be properly called “philosophical”
surely has theoretical aspects.
28 A healthy pragmatism should, instead of relying on an essentialistic dichotomy between
post-philosophical therapy and systematic argumentation, insist on the compatibility and
deep  complementarity  of  deconstruction  and  reconstruction.  Deconstruction  should
always  be  followed  by  reconstruction.  This  is  in  effect  what  Dewey  argued  in
Reconstruction in Philosophy (1920); as Putnam (1992) later put it, “deconstruction without
reconstruction is irresponsibility.” Thus, whenever a philosophical concept, problem, or
position is  “deconstructed” or  therapeutically  shown to  be  optional,  a  reconstructed
pragmatic account of whatever it is that originally drew philosophers’ attention to that
concept,  problem,  or position should follow.  For example,  while Dewey devastatingly
deconstructs a whole set of traditional philosophical dualisms – e.g., those between the
mind and the body, experience and nature, as well as knowledge and action, to name but
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a  few –  he  also  offers  a  reconstructed picture  of  how a  non-reductively  naturalized
philosophy in the service of democracy as a way of life can deal with the issues that were
previously  thought  to  require  these  problematic  dualisms.25 The  move  from
deconstruction to reconstruction is a stage in the process of inquiry needed to settle the
problematic situation the philosophers seeks to transform.
29 Therefore, the crude dichotomy between therapeutic and systematic philosophy is, again,
completely  unpragmatic  and  in  my view also  anti-Wittgensteinian,  as  it  assumes  an
essentialistic  conception  of  the proper  way  of  doing  philosophy,  without  letting  the
richness of  different philosophical  aims,  methods,  and conceptions flourish.  It  thinks
before looking, to use a Wittgensteinian phrase; or, to adopt a Peircean expression, it
blocks the road of inquiry. Our philosophical inquiries often need both deconstruction
and reconstruction; therefore, to narrow-mindedly restrict proper philosophizing to one
of these impedes philosophical understanding.
30 Just as pragmatism and pragmatically interpreted Wittgensteinianism seek to mediate
between the propositional and the non-propositional and between metaphysics and the
criticism of metaphysics, they also seek to mediate between therapeutic-deconstructive
and  systematic-reconstructive  conceptions  of  philosophy.  Here  pragmatism,  also
Wittgensteinianized pragmatism, can reaffirm its role – emphasized by, e.g.,  James in
Pragmatism (1907,  chapter  1)  –  as  a  critical  mediator,  a  middle-ground-seeker,
continuously hoping to reinterpret, re-evaluate, and transform traditional philosophical
controversies.
 
6. Philosophy of Religion: Applying the Criticism of the
Four Dichotomies
31 If we are able to avoid the dichotomies and assumptions discussed in the four previous
sections in a pragmatist and (I claim) Wittgensteinian way, we should also be able to look
and  see  what  happens  to  a  particular  field  of  philosophical  inquiry,  such  as  the
philosophy of religion, when they are avoided. Even though this paper cannot even begin
to  examine  the  Wittgensteinian  tradition  in  the  philosophy  of  religion,  or  even
Wittgenstein’s  own  views  on  religion,  at  any  length,26 let  us  very  briefly  consider
philosophical investigations of religion on the basis of the following four ideas derived
from the treatment of Wittgenstein’s relation to pragmatism above. Moreover, following
Goodman (2002) again, we should recognize that the commitment to the philosophical
importance of religion is shared by Wittgenstein and James, as well as by most other
pragmatists,  even  though  few  pragmatists  have  straightforwardly  defended  any
traditional religious worldview.
32 First, it may be suggested that religious believers’ specifically religious ‘certainties’ – the
basic convictions underlying their religious ‘language-games’ or forms of life – are both
propositional  and  non-propositional,  that  is,  manifesting  or  incorporating  (if  not  simply
expressible  in  the  form of)  theological  theses  (e.g.,  regarding  God’s  reality)  but  not
reducible to mere linguistic statements considered in abstraction from human habits of
action. Such certainties are, rather, themselves habits of action, combining propositional
and non-propositional elements (cf. section 2 above).
33 Secondly,  religious  beliefs,  including  action-based  ‘certainties,’  can  be  criticized  and
rationally  rejected  in  the  spirit  of  fallibilism  and  general  philosophical
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antifoundationalism;  yet,  just  as  there  is  no  rational  grounding  for  them  based  on
religiously neutral criteria of reason, they cannot be rejected simply because of the lack
of such grounding. This is comparable to ‘the truth in skepticism’ (see section 3 above).
Religious  beliefs,  understood  as  practice-embedded  certainties  or  fundamental
convictions shaping the believers’ lives, are not scientific-like hypotheses to be tested in
the way we test scientific or commonsensical beliefs about the world. Even so, they can be
given up and/or revised in the course of our on-going experience and its transformations.
They are  not  immune to  criticism,  because  our  lives  and their  contexts  can and do
change,  requiring us to modify the concepts and language-games (including religious
ones) we (may) employ to make sense of those lives. Or better, if one’s faith is immune to
criticism, then it is not genuinely religious at all (cf. Pihlström 2013, chapter 7).
34 Thirdly, pragmatist philosophers of religion should both criticize traditional dogmatically
metaphysical ways of pursuing theology and the philosophy of religion (e.g., the ‘proofs’
of God’s existence or the artificial logical puzzles related to the concept of omniscience,
for  instance)  and be  willing  to  consider  metaphysical  expressions  for  their  ideas
concerning  God,  the  soul,  etc.,  even  though  pragmatic  metaphysical  inquiries  into
religion  and  theology  primarily  have  to  start  from,  or  be  subordinated  to,  ethical
reflections on what it means to be a human being (cf. Pihlström 2013, especially chapters
2  and  5;  as  well  as  section  4  above).  In  addition,  for  instance,  process-theological
reconstruals  of  the  divinity  might  be  worth  exploring  from  both  pragmatist  and
Wittgensteinian perspectives.
35 Fourthly,  philosophy  of  religion,  like  Wittgensteinian-cum-pragmatist  philosophy
generally, should be both deconstructive and reconstructive (cf. section 5 above): we should,
therapeutically,  avoid  dogmatic  religious  and/or  theological  beliefs  but  also,
systematically and argumentatively, contribute to the critical analysis and evaluation of
such belief systems. These are two sides of the same coin and equally important as parts
of a philosophico-theological search for an ever deeper understanding of religion.
36 Both  pragmatist  and  Wittgensteinian  philosophers  of  religion  should,  in  my  view,
subscribe to something like these formulations concerning the nature and tasks of the
philosophy of religion today –admittedly only very briefly and preliminarily articulated
here.  We may,  more specifically,  join  Goodman (2002:  154)  in  understanding James’s
pragmatic conception of religion as ‘Wittgensteinian’: the significance of religious terms
is  ‘established by their  use’;  our understanding of  such terms,  symbols,  or  pictures is
constituted by the ‘service’  we put them to in our lives and practices, which is  very
different from claiming, along with the naïve pragmatic theory of truth, that the truth of
religious beliefs would be established by their utility or usefulness. Accordingly, it is not
on the basis of their usefulness –their utility value to the individual or even to the group–
that we determine the truth of religious views or beliefs; yet, when trying to articulate
the very meaning of those views and beliefs in the context of human life and culture, we
do have to refer to the ways they are ‘used’ – their ‘service’ for us – within our practices.
They have to ‘make a difference’ somehow, and in many cases the specific “difference”
religious ideas make in our lives is ethical in the sense that they enable us to see the
world and our lives within it in certain value-laden ways.
37 In order to articulate this pragmatist conception of religion in more detail, we need more
than  is  available  in  Wittgenstein’s  own  cryptic  and  aphoristic  remarks  on  religious
matters in Culture and Value (Wittgenstein 1980b) and in some of his students’ notes; we
need  a  more  systematic  pragmatic-cum-Wittgensteinian  investigation  of  the  ways  in
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which  religious  expressions,  symbols,  beliefs,  and  worldviews  are  embedded  and
employed in cultural practices. Wittgenstein’s philosophy of religion could therefore – in
a  more  comprehensive  discussion  –be  interestingly  compared  not  only  to  James’s
pioneering work on religious experience and his pragmatic defense of the legitimacy of
religious beliefs in terms of their morally motivating force (see James 1907, chapter 8) but
also  to  Dewey’s  (1934)  religious  naturalism,  which  seeks  to  accommodate  religious
experience and values, including even the concept “God,” within a naturalistic position
avoiding any dogmatic  commitments  to  supernaturalist  metaphysics  and pre-modern
non-democratic social structures and institutions. “The religious,” according to Dewey –
and I suppose we might say, according to Wittgenstein as well – must be emancipated
from historical religions and their dogmatic creeds that often hinder, instead of enabling,
the flourishing of the truly religious qualities of experience (cf. Pihlström 2013, chapter
3). This paper, however, cannot develop these themes any further.
 
7. Conclusion
38 My reflections on Wittgenstein’s relation to pragmatism have been partly programmatic
and certainly need to be made more precise, both historically and systematically. I do not
think  I  have  offered  any  fundamentally  new  interpretation  of  Wittgenstein  (or  the
pragmatists);  this  paper  has  only  offered  a  proposal to  consider  these  philosophical
frameworks together in a certain way. Yet, I hope that by putting these two philosophical
perspectives together in this specific way, questioning the dichotomies I find pernicious,
may help us in reinterpreting both as orientations that ought to be taken very seriously
in today’s philosophical discussions – concerning metaphysics, religion, or the nature of
philosophy  itself.  In  particular,  while  philosophical  thought  must  obviously  make
distinctions and use them for specific purposes, it is crucially important to move beyond
the  dichotomies  briefly  discussed in  sections  2-5  above,  as  such oppositions  tend to
hinder philosophical progress instead of enhancing philosophical understanding.27
39 While there would be no point in insisting that Wittgenstein was a ‘pragmatist,’ given
that ‘pragmatism’ may itself be regarded as a ‘family-resemblance’ term and concept (cf.
Goodman  2002:  178),  we  may  see  Wittgenstein  as  offering  a pragmatist  (or  at  least
pragmatic)  answer  to  a  transcendental  question  concerning  the  very  possibility  of
meaning. He argues – in his own peculiar non-linear way – throughout his late works that
the possibility  of  language and meaning is  (non-foundationally,  fallibly)  grounded in
public human practices, or forms of life, within which language is used, that is, practices,
or perhaps better, habits of action whose radical contingency and continuous historical
development  are  among  their  key  features.  Moreover,  Wittgenstein’s  pragmatist
acknowledgment of there being no higher standpoint for us to adopt than the humanly
accessible perspectives internal to our language-games and practices (that is,  that we
cannot reach a ‘God’s-Eye View,’ or that aspiring to do that would be a misunderstanding
of  the  human  condition,  rather  than  an  attempt  to  do  something  that  would  be
meaningful yet contingently beyond capacities) may be regarded as his pragmatic reason
for pursuing the ‘transcendental’ problem concerning the possibility of meaning in the
first place. The fact that Wittgenstein’s transcendental problems must be taken seriously
even within a pragmatist interpretation highlights the fact that the Kantian background
of both pragmatism and Wittgensteinian philosophy ought to be acknowledged. As I have
suggested, Wittgenstein poses transcendental questions (e.g., ‘how is meaning possible?’)
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and offers pragmatic answers to them (e.g., in terms of ‘certainties-in-action,’ or ‘hinges’).
Moreover, it goes very well together with this Kantian-cum-pragmatist approach to resist
any strict, essentialistic dichotomy between the ontological structure of the world itself
and the conceptual structure we impose on the world through our language-games, and
to  endorse  the  moderately  constructivist  view  that  the  world  we  live  in  is  to  a
considerable extent constituted by our categorizing it in terms of our language-use.28
40 This  Kantian  background  of  pragmatism brings  me  to  my  final  conclusion.  To  be  a
pragmatist, or to be a Wittgensteinian thinker today, is to be continuously reflexively –
transcendentally, as we may say – concerned with one’s own philosophical perspectives
and approaches,  not  only with their  intellectual  but  more broadly with their  ethical
integrity.  It  is  to  turn  one’s  self-critical  gaze  toward  one’s  own  practices  of
philosophizing, one’s own being-in-the-world, one’s own habits of action, intellectual as
well as more concretely practical. In James’s terms, it is to take full responsibility of one’s
individual “philosophical temperament” (see James 1907, chapter 1) and to self-critically
develop it further, through one’s contextualizing inquiries, hopefully learning to listen to
the richness of the human ‘voices’ speaking to us from within the indefinite plurality of
language-games that our fellow human beings play with each other and with us.
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NOTES
1. I will occasionally refer to Goodman’s interpretation throughout this essay, but I try to look at
the relation between Wittgenstein and pragmatism from a slightly different angle (and not to
restrict myself to the comparison of Wittgenstein and James).  For some pioneering historical
work  on  the  relations  between  Wittgenstein  and  Peirce,  see  Bambrough  1981,  Gullvåg  1981,
Haack 1982, Nubiola 1996, and Crocker 1998. Wittgenstein’s relation to James was discussed by
commentators  already  earlier  (cf.  Fairbanks  1966,  Wertz  1972,  Baum  1980),  but  Goodman’s
interpretation is  much more comprehensive  and detailed.  (See,  however,  also  Ben-Menahem
1998.) On the other hand, some of the more recent interpreters who find connections between
Wittgenstein  and  pragmatism  fail  to  consider  Wittgenstein  in  relation  to  the  historical
pragmatist  tradition.  This  is  as  true  about  those  who  read  Wittgenstein  in  relation  to
deconstruction and postmodernist (Rortyan) ‘pragmatism’ (see the essays in Nagl & Mouffe (eds.)
2001) as it is about those for whom pragmatism seems to be basically a certain anti-skeptical
position  within  analytic epistemology  (Bilgrami  2004),  or  a  view  of  norms  alternative  to
‘epistemological realism’ (Williams 2004, especially 95-6).
2. See Goodman’s (2002, especially chapter 2) discussion of Wittgenstein’s reception of James’s
Varieties. On the pragmatic method or pragmatist principle, see, e.g., the various reflections in
Pihlström (ed.) 2011.
3. I  do think that  Putnam’s  readings of  Wittgenstein in relation to Kant and the pragmatist
tradition (e.g., in Putnam 1995) are largely on the right track – indeed, Putnam is one of the few
thinkers who admit that both Wittgenstein and the pragmatists share a Kantian heritage – and
therefore  part  of  what  I  am  going  to  say  is  to  some  extent  indebted  to  Putnam,  both
philosophically and historically, but I am not going to explicitly rely on his interpretations of
Wittgenstein or the pragmatists here. In this essay, space does not allow me to elaborate on the
interpretation  of  Wittgenstein  as  a  (neo-)Kantian  thinker  engaged  in  transcendental
argumentation. While I  share such a picture of Wittgenstein (cf.  Pihlström 2003,  2004,  2006),
believing  it  can  be  pragmatically  enriched,  its  defense  is  not  necessary  for  the  present
examination of  Wittgenstein’s  relation to pragmatism. See also Pihlström (ed.)  2006,  and see
section 5 below.
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4. For  Price’s  defense  of  global  expressivism  as  the  framework  within  which  Wittgenstein’s
linguistic  (functional)  pluralism  makes  sense,  see  especially  Price  2011,  chapter  10  (cf.  also
chapter 14). For a “Kantian” (and Wittgensteinian) pragmatist, an interesting further question
inspired  by  Price’s  work  would  be  whether  global  expressivism  could  be  understood  as  a
pragmatist  version  of  transcendental  idealism within  which  (only)  a  pragmatic  or  empirical
realism becomes possible. This paper is not the proper place to examine such an issue further,
though. I should note, however, that where I clearly would not follow Price’s pragmatism is his
strongly  anti-metaphysical  approach.  In  my  view,  the  pragmatist  should  not  “escape”
metaphysical and ontological questions, should not simply “replace” them with questions about
thought  and  language,  and  should  not  embrace  “anthropology”  instead  of  a  (renewed)
metaphysics “in a pragmatist key” (cf. ibid.:  315). For an alternative pragmatist conception of
metaphysics, see Pihlström 2009; cf. also Pihlström (ed.) 2011.
5. This idea could be spelled out, e.g., in terms of Morton White’s holistic pragmatism (e.g., 2002);
cf. also Peperzak 1986.
6. This is something I have to some extent tried to do in earlier publications (cf. Pihlström 2003,
2004, 2006, (ed.) 2006). I am not going to repeat those reflections here; fortunately, I hope I do
have  novel  points  to  add.  Moreover,  while  my  more  recent  investigations  of  pragmatism
(Pihlström 2009,  (ed.)  2011,  2013)  do not  explicitly  deal  with Wittgenstein,  their  approach is
compatible with a “Wittgensteinianized” pragmatism as well.
7. The  key  reference  here  is  Daniele  Moyal-Sharrock’s  interpretation,  as  defended  in  her
monograph on On Certainty and her papers on the ‘third Wittgenstein’: see Moyal-Sharrock 2004,
and (ed.) 2004, as well as Moyal-Sharrock & Brenner (eds.) 2007.
8. On Wittgenstein’s (late) philosophy as a pragmatist response to a transcendental problem, see
also Pihlström 2003, chapter 2. Goodman (2002: 28) also notes that the Wittgensteinian ‘we’ is
‘the ‘necessary’ or ‘transcendental’ we of the ‘human.’ For a more comprehensive treatment of
Wittgenstein and the “transcendental we,” see Lear 1998. Cf. section 5 below.
9. Another  scholar  explicitly  referring  to  the  ‘primacy  of  practice’  as  Wittgenstein’s  view is
Anthony Rudd (see his 2007:  153).  He even suggests that we might call  Wittgenstein’s stance
‘transcendental pragmatism’ (ibid.: 158) – also suggested by myself in Pihlström 2003, chapter 2.
Rudd’s (2007: 146) illuminating discussion of Wittgenstein’s Zettel (Wittgenstein 1970: §§ 413-4) –
the famous example of the realist and the idealist teaching their children the word ‘chair,’ with
no genuine difference in these teachings that would make any practical difference – could also
benefit from an explicit comparison to James’s (1907, chapter 2) pragmatic method, which argues
for the same conclusion: “if a philosophical difference does not show itself in any way in practice,
there is no real point at issue at all” (Rudd 2007: 146).
10. Relevant writings by Peirce and James on beliefs as habits of action can be found in Peirce
(1992-98,  especially  vol.  1  and  the  classical  1877  essay,  “The  Fixation  of  Belief,”  contained
therein) and James (1907), particularly chapter 2. In this paper, I cannot discuss these or other
pragmatist classics in any detail.
11. Note, then, that I am not here using the term ‘habit’ in any technical Peircean logical and/or
semiotic sense but more loosely as referring to human habitual practices. This concept is a close
relative of the concept of a form of life in Wittgenstein. However, my usage of ‘habit’ does, I
think, retain a link to the views of the founder of pragmatism, given that it is in terms of habits
that we have to understand our ability to make any sense at all  with our linguistic or other
semiotic expressions. Habits are a key to signification – but also to inquiry and belief-fixation, as
both Peirce and later Dewey argued.
12. See the essays collected in Hintikka 1996. This is not to say that Hintikka would accept this
view (“language-game holism,” as it has sometimes been labeled) as a philosophical conception
of language, even though he does believe it was Wittgenstein’s position. Cf. also Price’s (very
different) proposal to give “a pragmatic account of the origins of the semantic” (Price 2011: 205).
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Goodman (2002: 14-5) speaks about “pragmatic holism” as a Jamesian view that Wittgenstein felt
coming “uncomfortably close” to his own position.
13. On the possibility of fallibilist transcendental argumentation, see Westphal 2003. Goodman
(2002)  in  my  view  makes  justice  to  both  aspects  of  Wittgenstein  by  both  emphasizing  that
Wittgenstein and James shared a commitment to antifoundationalism (ibid., 5) and duly noting
that Wittgenstein, unlike James, maintained a clear distinction between philosophy and science,
or philosophical and empirical justification (ibid.: 30-1). Another important difference between
Wittgenstein  and pragmatism is  political  and cultural:  Wittgenstein  never  shared any of  the
progressivism of the pragmatists (see ibid.: 167 ff.).
14. I am not saying that these concepts are identical. My point is general enough to be made with
regard to any or all of them, depending on one’s philosophical (and terminological) preferences.
15. This, of course, is something that has famously been elaborated on by Stanley Cavell (see his
1979).  However,  Cavell,  presumably,  would  find  little  added  value  in  comparisons  between
Wittgenstein and pragmatism. For more comprehensive discussions of Wittgenstein’s relation to
skepticism, see McManus 2004.
16. My use of a Heideggerian phrase here is of course deliberate. In Heidegger’s case as much as
in Wittgenstein’s, the question of possible links to pragmatism has been discussed (e.g., Okrent
1988) and needs further discussion.
17. Cf., e.g., Putnam’s work on this topic, especially Putnam 2002; see also Pihlström 2005.
18. It is far from clear that Quine can be called a “pragmatist” at all, despite his influence on both
Putnam’s and Rorty’s versions of neopragmatism. See Koskinen & Pihlström 2006.
19. I  am fully  aware that  some New Wittgensteinians resist  such formulations.  See the next
section for a brief pragmatic critique of such views.
20. Another  possible  example  of  a  metaphysical  topic  receiving  a  pragmatic-cum-
Wittgensteinian treatment is the ‘actionist’ (‘interventionist,’ ‘manipulative’) theory of causation
defended  by  one  of  Wittgenstein’s  distinguished  followers,  G. H. von Wright  (1971,  1974).
However,  it  is  unclear  whether  we  can  say  that  von  Wright’s  views  on,  say,  causation  are
“metaphysical”  at  all;  he  is  generally  an  anti-metaphysical  thinker,  like  so  many
Wittgensteinians,  and  he  can  be  said  to  investigate  the  concept  of  causation  instead  of  the
metaphysical structure of causation itself. But then, again, this dichotomy between metaphysical
structures of reality and our conceptualizations of those structures from within our practices
must  be  called  into  question  by  the  pragmatist  (and,  a  fortiori,  by  the  Wittgensteinian
pragmatist). 
21. See Crary & Read 2000, Wallgren 2006, as well as several essays in Pihlström (ed.) 2006.
22. The “Kantian” tradition in interpretations of Wittgenstein goes back at least to Erik Stenius’s
seminal study (Stenius 1960).
23. See the discussion of ‘hinges’ and the ‘logically pragmatist’ interpretation of On Certainty in
section 2  above.  The notion of  “transcendental  pragmatism” was already referred to in  that
context (cf. Pihlström 2003; Rudd 2007).
24. Note also that the transcendental interpretation is certainly not the only way of making
Wittgenstein a philosopher of theses and arguments. Wittgenstein has, of course, been employed
in the service of analytic philosophy of language in a distinctively pragmatist manner by Huw
Price (2011):  his  expressivist,  minimalist,  and  functionally  pluralist  engagement  with
Wittgenstein, or engagement with semantics from a Wittgensteinian perspective, is certainly not
deconstructive  in  the  sense  of  Rorty’s  or  the  New  Wittgensteinians’  projects  but  genuinely
reconstructive (which does not mean I would agree with his use of Wittgenstein: Price is too anti-
metaphysical a pragmatist for my taste, as was noted above).
25. Similarly, we might say that James (1907, chapters 3-4) first deconstructs, by employing (his
version  of)  the  pragmatic  method,  several  traditional  philosophical  issues  and  ideas  (e.g.,
substance,  the  free  will,  God,  and  the  dispute  between  monism  and  pluralism),  and  then
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reconstructs these issues and the corresponding debates in terms of his pragmatist grounding of
metaphysics  in  ethics.  Thus,  he  does  not  suggest  (deconstructively)  that  we  should  simply
abandon those issues or the related philosophical concepts; he (reconstructively) suggests that
we can find their pragmatic core by using the pragmatic method (cf. Pihlström 2009).
26. D. Z. Phillips’s work is, of course, the most widely read – and most controversial – within
‘Wittgensteinian’ philosophy of religion. For a collection of up-to-date essays, see Phillips and
von der Ruhr  (eds.)  2005.  These  discussions  rarely  connect  Wittgenstein,  or  Wittgensteinian
philosophy of religion, with pragmatism; for some reflections in this regard, see Pihlström 2013,
especially chapter 3; for an earlier attempt to connect Wittgenstein’s philosophy of religion with
the pragmatists,’ see Pihlström 1996, chapter 5.
27. There is a sense in which James might even be seen as a more thoroughgoing critic of harmful
dichotomies  than  Wittgenstein.  Yemina  Ben-Menahem  touches  something  important  in  the
following: “James’s pragmatism is no less a critique of traditional fixations than is Wittgenstein’s.
But  the  philosophical  dichotomies  Wittgenstein  holds  fast  to,  fact  and  value,  internal  and
external, causes and reasons, are the very dichotomies James is trying to bridge. Thus, while for
Wittgenstein the description of language is the description of its grammatical internal relations,
for James the internal and the external, the causal and the linguistic, are ultimately inseparable”
(Ben-Menahem 1998: 134). Accordingly, while I have argued that Wittgenstein shares with the
pragmatists a critical attitude to certain dichotomies taken to be foundational to philosophy – or,
perhaps  better,  that  a  pragmatist  interpreter  of  Wittgenstein  should  view  Wittgenstein’s
philosophy in  such a  manner  that  those  dichotomies  are  left  aside  –  this  is  not  to  say  that
Wittgenstein and the pragmatists would have rejected all and only the same dichotomies. There
are dichotomies that Wittgenstein, unlike the pragmatists (or at least James) holds fast to.
28. Taking this view ontologically seriously might also throw new light on Wittgenstein’s (1953, I:
§§ 371, 373) well-known claims about ‘essence’ lying in grammar.
ABSTRACTS
This essay reconsiders Wittgenstein’s relation to the pragmatist tradition. I first discuss, from a
pragmatist  perspective,  three key issues of Wittgenstein studies:  the distinction – invoked in
recent discussions of On Certainty, in particular – between the propositional and the non-propositional
(section 2); the tension between anti-Cartesian fallibilism and what has been called the ‘truth in
skepticism’ in Wittgenstein (section 3); as well as the relation between metaphysics and the criticism
of  metaphysics  in  Wittgenstein’s  philosophy,  and  Wittgensteinian  philosophy  more  generally
(section 4). I then proceed to a more metaphilosophical consideration of yet another problematic
dichotomy,  the  one  between  deconstructive  (therapeutic)  and  (re)constructive  or  systematic,
argumentative philosophy – which, I argue, the pragmatist, together with Wittgenstein, ought to
overcome  rather  than  rely  on  (section  5).  After  having  gone  through  these  open  issues  in
Wittgenstein scholarship at a general level, I briefly apply my considerations to the philosophy of
religion, which is an important field of inquiry for both Wittgensteinian and pragmatist thinkers
(section 6).
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